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ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A CROSS SECTION OF COUNTRIES
ABSTRACT
In neoclassical growth models with diminishing returns to capital, a
country's per capita growth rate tends to be inversely related to its initial
level of income per person. This convergence hypothesis seems to be
inconsistent with the cross-country evidence, which indicates that per capita
growth rates for about 100 countries in the post-World War II period are
uncorrelated with the starting level of per capita product. However, if one
holds constant measures of initial human capital—measured by primary and
secondary school-enrollment rates—there is evidence that countries with
lower per capita product tend to grow faster. Countries with higher human
capital also have lower fertility rates and higher ratios of physical
investment to GDP. These results on growth, fertility, and investment are
consistent with some recent theories of endogenous economic growth. With
regard to government, the cross-country data indicate that government
consumption is inversely related to growth, whereas public investment has
little relation with growth. Average growth rates are positively related to
political stability, which may capture the benefits of secure property
rights. There is also some indication that distortions of investment-goods
prices are adverse for growth. Finally, the analysis leaves unexplained a
good deal of the relatively weak growth performances of countries in




Cambridge, MA 02138In neoclassical growth models with diminishing returns to capital, such
as Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965), a country's per capita
growth rate tends to be inversely related to its starting level of income per
person.1 Therefore, in the absence of shocks, poor and rich countries would
tend to converge in terms of levels of per capita income. However, this
convergence hypothesis seems to be inconsistent with the cross-country
evidence, which indicates that per capita growth rates are uncorrelated with
the starting level of per capita product. Figure 1 Shows this type of
relationship for 98 countries. Using the data from the Summers-ileston (1988)
international comparison project, the average growth rate of per capita real
GDP from 1960 to 1985 (denoted CR6085) is unrelated to the 1960 value of real
per capita GDP (GDP6O)—the correlation is •Ø9•2 Although inconsistent with
standard neoclassical growth theories, these findings accord with recent
models, such as those of Rebelo (1987) and Lucas (1988), that assume constant
returns to a broad concept of capital, which includes human capital. In
these models the growth rate of per capita product is independent of the
starting level of per capita product.
Models with constant returns to physical and human capital together also
allow for transitional dynamics. Rebelo (1987) and Lucas (1988) use a
'The idea is that the starting level of per capita income is a proxy for the
capital-labor ratio. The smaller the ratio the further the distance from the
steady state and the higher the transitional rate of per capita growth. For
further discussion, see Rebelo (1987).
21usethroughout the values of GDP expressed in terms of prices for the base
year, 1980. Results using chain-weighted values of GDP are not very
different.2
two-sector production model, where one sector produces the usual kind of
product (consumables and capital goods) and the other sector produces human
capital. In this framework, the initial ratio of human to physical capital
can depart from its steady-state value. For example, if human capital is
high relative to physical capital (as in post-war situations where the main
wartime destruction applied to physical capital), the subsequent path way
feature high rates of physical investment and per capita growth. Then the
prediction is that a country's rates of physical investment and per capita
growth are increasing in its starting ratio of human to physical capital.
Becker and Murphy (1988) also consider transitional dynamics related to
the level of human capital per person. They allow the rate of return on
human capital to increase over some range, an effect that could arise because
of spillover benefits from human capital. That is, the return to some kinds
of ability (such as talent in communications) is higher if other people are
also more able. [n this setting, increases in the quantity of human capital
per person tend to lead to higher rates of investment in human and physical
capital, and hence, to higher per capita growth. (This conclusion applies in
the Becker-Murphy model if the initial level of human capital perperson is
high enough to escape a trap of underdevelopwent.) A supporting force is
that more human capital per person reduces fertility rates, because human
capital is more productive in producing goods or additional human capital
rather than more children.
The existing theories suggest that growth rates and ratios of investment
to GDP may relate to the starting value of human capital differently from the
starting value of physical capital, which includes natural resources as well
as reproducible capital.In• my empirical analysis, I use a proxy for human3
capital that is based on school enrollment rates, and use initial real per
capita GDP to measure the starting value of physical capital. That is, given
the human capital proxy, differences in per capita GDP would reflect
differences in reproducible capital or natural resources.
Basic Results f.t Growth Rates
Table 1 shows regressions f"r annual average growth rates of per capita
real GD?. Most of the results apply from 1960 to 1985 to a cross section of
98 countries (the largest number of countries on which I have been able to
assemble data on the variables employed). Since heteroskedasticity could be
important across countries, the standard errors for the coefficients are
based on White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.
However, these standard rrors do not differ greatly from those obtained by
ordinary least squares. The table also includes regressions in which the
observations are weighted in accordance with the levels of gross domestic
product or population.
The GD? data come from Summers and Heston (1988), while other variables
(to be detailed in a forthcoming data set) are from the United Nations, the
World Bank, Banks's (1979) data base, and some other sources. Means,
standard deviations, and definitions for all variables appear in Table 5, and
a list of countries is in Table 6. For the moment, I will concentrate on
results related to the initial (1960) values of per capita GD? and the human
capital proxies. The other variables, discussed later, are not strongly
correlated with these variables.4
The two main proxies for human capital are the 1960 values of school-
enrollment rates at the secondary (SEC6O) and primary levels (PRIM6O).3
These variables, based on information from the United Nations, measure number
of students enrolled in the designated grade levels relative to the total
population of the corresponding age group. (Because of this definition it is
possible for the values to exceed 1.0.) Vith these school-enrollment rates
(and, less importantly, the other explanatory variables) held constant, thc
estimated coefficient on starting per capita product, GDP6O, in regression I
of Table 1 is negative and highly significant: -.0075,s.e. =.0012.Since
GDP6O is measured in thousands of 1980 U.S. dollars, the result means that an
increase in per capita real GOP by $1000 lowers the real per capita growth
rate (CR6085) by .75 percentage points per year. Figure 2 plots CR6085, net
of the value predicted by all explanatory variables except GDP6O, versus
GDP6O. That is, the figure shows the partial correlation between CR6085 and
GDP6O. In contrast with Figure 1, there is now a strong negative
relationship (correlation =- .74).Thus, the results indicate that—holding
constant a set of variables that includes proxies for human capital—higher
initial per capita GDP is substantially negatively related to subsequentper
capita growth. The sample range of variation in GDP6O (in 1980 U.S. dollars)
from $208 to $7380 "explains" a spread in average per capita growth rates of
31t would be better to use proxies for the initial stock of human capitalper
person rather than variables that relate to the flow of investment in human
capital. The stock of human capital derived from formal education depends on
current and lagged values of school-enrollment rates. In the subsequent
discussj•on I consider effects from lagged values of the school-enrollment
variables.5
about five percentage points. (The sample range in per capita growth rates
is -.017to .074, with a mean of .022.)
Regression 2 adds the square of GDP6O; that is, instead of a linear form,
the relation between GR6085 and GDP6O is now quadratic. The estimated
coefficient of the square term is positive but only marginally significant
(t-value =1.4),while the coefficient on the linear term remains
significantly negative (t-value =3.6).A positive coefficent on the square
term means that the force toward convergence (negative relation between
growth and level) attenuates as per capita GD? rises. The point estimates
imply that the relation between growth and level is negative (holding
constant the other variables) only if real per capita GD? is less than
$10800. All values for GDP6O in the sample are below this figure, but values
for several of the industrialized countries exceeded this amount after 1960.
For example, the U.S. real per capita GOP surpassed $10800 in 1977.
Another result in regressions 1 and 2 of Table 1 is that per capita
growth is positively related to the proxies for initial human capital,
holding fixed GDP6O and the other variables.4 The estimated coefficients of
4As noted before, the quadratic in GDP6O in regression 2 implies that the
marginal effect of the level of GOP on growth becomes nil when GDP6O reaches
$10800. For GDP6O above $10800, the quadratic implies a positive relation
between level and growth, but the true relation may remain close to zero.
That is, the quadratic can be viewed as an approximation to a functional form
that asymptotically approaches a zero relation between growth and level, with
the relation coming close to zero when real GD? is above $10000. The
human-capital variables, SEC6O and PRIM6O, are positively correlated with
GDP6O (correlations of .79 and .65, respectively). However, the
school-enrollment rates each have an upper asymptote of around 1007., and each
rate would typically be close to this asymptote once real GD? reached $10000.
Thus, even considering the interplay between human capital and per capita
CD?, it is likely that convergence effects would be absent once per capita
real CDP was above $10000.6
SEC6O and PRIM6O are individually significantly different from zero, with
t-values in regression 1 of 3.8 and 4.4, respectively. A joint test for the
significance of the two school-enrollment variables leads to the statistic,
F5 =18.5.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between the per capita growth rate, net
of the value predicted by the regressors other than the school-enrollment
variables, and a linear combination of SEC6O and PRIMCC. (The variable on
the horizontal axis is .0305 x SEC6O +.0250x PRIM6O, corresponding to the
coefficients estimated in regression 1 of Table 1.) The partial correlation
of CR6085 with the human capital proxy is .73, as opposed to a simple
correlation of .43. (Figure 4 shows the simple relation between CR6085 and
the human capital measure.)
Note from Figure 3 that the sample range of the human capital proxy
t'explain&' a range of variation in per capita growth rates of about five
percentage points; that is, roughly the same range as that related to CDP6O
in Figure 2. Thus, given the strong positive correlation (.77) between GDP6O
and the human capital measure, the results are consistent with the lack of a
simple correlation between CR6085 and GDP6O, as shown in Figure 1. Increases
in initial GDP per capita that are accompanied by the typical increase in
human capital per person are not systematically related to subsequent growth.
But increases in initial CUP per capita with human capital held fixed are
strongly negatively related to subsequent growth. Similarly, increases in
human capital with CDP6O held fixed are strongly positively related to
subsequent growth.
The results can be highlighted by noting three kinds of situations where
an imbalance between GDP per capita and human capital leads to significant7
effects on subsequent growth rates. Many of the Pacific rim countries have
initial (1960) school-enrollment rates that are high relative to those
typically associated with the initial value of real GDP per capita. For
example, for Japan, the value of SEC6O is .74, as compared to the value of
.31 that would be predicted from a regression of SEC6O on a quadratic
function of GDP6O. For Korea and Taiwan, the values of PR1M60 are .94 and
.96, respectively, as compared to the corresponding predicted values of .61
and .66. According to regression 1 in Table 1, the relatively high values
for initial school-enrollment rates raised the estimated growth rates by .015
for Japan, .014 for Korea, and .012 for Taiwan. With this effect included,
the fitted value of the growth rate for Japan, .057, is close to the actual
value of .058. For Korea and Taiwan, the adjustments are in the right
direction but are insuffient to explain the high rates of growth: for
Korea, the fitted value is .037 and the actual is .060, while for Taiwan, the
fitted value is .041 and the actual is .057.
The typical country in sub- Saharan Africa has 1960 school-enrollment
rates that are low relative to the values associated with 1960 per capita GDP
in the full sample. This pattern likely reflects physical capital from the
colonial era that is high in relation to the amount of initial human capital,
as well as relatively high quantities of natural resources. For example, the
relatively low values for school enrollment reduced the estimated growth
rates by .012 for Ethiopia (fitted value for growth of .001 versus an actual
of .003), .011 for Sudan (fitted value for growth of -.003,actual of -.008),
and by .011 for Senegal (fitted value for growth of .004, actual of .000).
Given the remaining explanatory power of a dummy variable for Africa, as8
discussed later, it maybethat the present specification does not capture
this effect fully.
Finally, the oil-exporting countries typically have high values of GDP6C
relative to their 1960 school-enrollment rates. The sample includes six
members of OPEC: Algeria, Gabon, Indonesia, Nigeria, Iran, and Venezuela.5
For Gabon, the school-enrollment rates are higher than would be predicted
based on GDP6O (which helps to explain Gabon's high growth rate), while for
Indonesia, the discrepancies are small. For the other four oil countries,
the shortfalls of the school-enrollment rates from the predicted values
reduces the estimated growth rate by an average of .012. Except for Iran,
this effect improves the fit for growth rates.
Measurement Errors Related Issues
Romer (1989) notes that a result such as that shown in Figure 2 would be
sensitive to measurement error in GDP. If there is temporary measurement
error, future growth rates of GDP will automatically have a negative
correlation with the starting level. However, for this effect to account fo
the findings, measurement error has to be very large, as well as temporary.
For example, a 107. error in GDP that is corrected over the subsequent 25
years affects the computed annual average growth rate by only -.004.This
value contrasts with the range of variation of about .05 that GDP6O appears
5My earlier study (Barro, 1989a) deleted the oil countries. However, with
initial measures of human capital included along with initial per capita GOP
these countries can be satisfactorily incoporated into the sample. Without
the human capital variables, the oil countries particularly look like
outliers with respect to fertility behavior, which is analyzed later.9
to explain. For analogous reasons, business-cycle fluctuations in GDP could
not explain very much of the results.
If measurement error in GOP were short lived, no estimation problem would
arise in the relation between the 1960 level of per capita GOP and, say, the
average growth rate of per capita GOP from 1970 to 1985 (GR7085). Regression
3 in Table 1 shows that the estimated coefficients for GDP6O, SEC6O, and
PRIM6O are not much affected by this change in the dependent variable. Thus,
measurement errors (or business-cycle effects) can be important for the
results only if they persist in substantial magnitude over periods longer
than ten years.
Regression 4 shows that the conclusions do not change greatly if GDP7O is
added along with GDP6O (with the growth rate from 1970 to 1985 as the
dependent variable). Although the high correlation (.98) between CDP6O and
GDP7O implies high standard errors, the sum of the two coefficients is close
to that for GDP6O in regression 3. The estimated relation between per capita
growth and level of per capita GOP also looks similar if GDP7O is entered as
a regressor with GDP6O used as an instrument.
Presumably, measurement error in GDP would be proportionately more
important for the low-income countries. In fact, the squared residuals from
regression 1 of Table 1 have a correlation of -.23with GDP6O. Regression 5
shows that the estimated coefficient of GDP6O changes little if the sample is
restricted to the 54 countries for which GDP6O exceeds $1000 per capita.
Regression 6 shows that the results also do not change greatly if the
observations are weighted by the square root of GDP6O (which is appropriate
if the variance of the error term is proportional to the reciprocal of
GDP6O). Regression 7 indicates similar findings when the weight is the10
square root of population (where population is measured at the midpoint of
the sample for each country). This standard weighting scheme is appropriate
if the variance of the error term is proportional to the reciprocal of
population.6 However, the correlation of the square of the residuals from
regression 1 with population is only -.12.
Other Measures j Human CaDital
Regressions 8-12 attempt to improve the proxies for initial human
capital.Regression 8 adds the 1950 values of the school-enrollment rates
(SEC5O and PRIM5O) to a regression for CR6085. From the standpoint of the
human capital available at the start of the sample in 1960, prior values of
school enrollment would be more important than the 1960 values. Although the
point estimate for SEC5O in regression 8 is positive, neither of the 1950
schooling variables are statistically significant. Since the estimated
coefficients for SEC6O and PRIM6O remain significantly positive, the results
cannot be attributed to the high correlation (.83 for secondary and .86 for
primary) between the enrollment-rate variables for 1950 and 1960.
A possible explanation for the results is that the U.N. data for 1950 are
less accurate than those for 1960 and later years. Some support for this
view comes from regression 9, which includes enrollment rates for 1960 and
1970 in a regression for the growth rate from 1970 to 1985 (CR7085). For the
6This weightin scheme would arise if the growth rate ofper capita CDP were
an average of independent values for each person in the population. Asmany
people have noted, this view is an uninteresting theory of the error term,
since the error would likely vanish in the mean of several million
independent observations. If the error term relates to common aggregate
forces or to model specification, the error variance need not beclosely
related to population.11
primary-school variables, PRIM6O is significantly positive, while PRIM7O is
insignificant. Neither of the secondary-school variables are separately
significant because of the high correlation (.94) between SEC6O and SEC7O.
(The correlation between PRIM6O and PRIM7O is only .84.)
As an attempt to measure differences in the quality of education across
countries, I used data on student-teacher ratios in the initial year, 1960.
Regression 10 for GR6085 shows that the ratio for primary c!ools (S1'TEAPRI)
has a negative coefficient (t-value =1.9),which accords with the idea that
a higher ratio signals lower quality education. Student-teacher ratios for
secondary schools in 1960wereavailable for only 88 of the 98 countries.
Regression 11 shows that the estimated coefficient of this variable
(STTEASEC) differed insignificantly from zero.
Regression 12 uses tLe human-capital proxy employed by Romer (1989)—the
1960 adult literacy rate (LIT6O). With the school-enrollment rates entered,
the estimated coefficient of LIT6O is negative (t-value =2.0),which is
difficult to interpret. (If the school enrollment variables are excluded,
the coefficient of LIT6O is significiantly positive.) The literacy rate is
attractive in that it relates to the stock of human capital rather than to
the flow of investment. On the other hand, literacy rates appear to be
measured in an inconsistent way across countries, and are particularly
inaccurate for the less-developed countries. The school-enrollment rates,
although not immune from measurement problems, are likely to be more accurate
and more consistent cross sectionally.
Fertility Investment
The theories where the initial values of human capital and per capita CDP12
matter for subsequent growth rates also suggest relations with fertility and
investment. Table 2 shows results for fertility. The variable FERT is the
average of the 1965 and 1985 values of the World Bank's estimate of the tota
fertility rate (the projected average number of live births for the typical
woman over her lifetime). FERTNET is FERT x (1 -MORTO4),where MORTO4 is
the average of the 1965 and 1985 values of the World Bank's figures on
mortality rates for children aged zero through four. Thus, FERTNET is the
per woman number of children who will live beyond the age of four.
Figures 5 and 6 show the strongly negative simple correlations between
FERTNET and GDP6O (-.74)and between FERTNET and a human capital proxy
(-.87).(The human capital measure is 3.01 x SEC6O +1.56x PRIM6O, based on
regression 15 in Table 2). In regression 15, the two school-enrollment rates
have significantly negative coefficients,. while the coefficient of GDP6O is
insignificant. Thus, for a given value of per capita GDP, more human capital
is associated with lower net fertility, as would be suggested by Becker and
Murphy (1988), among others. For given human capital, higher per capita CD?
(which means more physical capital or natural resources) has an insignificant
relation with net fertility.
Regression 16 shows that, with no adjustment for child mortality, gross
fertility (FERT) is positively related to the child mortality rate, MORTO4.
But regression 17 indicates that the estimated coefficient of MORTO4 isno
longer significantly different from zero when FERTNET is the dependent
variable. That is, the adjustment of fertility rates to reflect the fraction
of children that do not survive past theage of four is sufficient to account
for most of the positive relation betweengross fertility and child
mortality. (From the standpoint of the costs of raising surviving children.13
one would predict, if anything, a negative relation between MORTO4 and
FERTNET.) Regression 18 shows that population growth (averaged for each
country from 1960 to 1985) relates to GDP6O and the human capital variables
in a way consistent with the findings for fertility rates.
Table 3 contains results for ratios of real physical investment to real
GDP. Regressions 20 and 21 refer to private investment (1Pr1'/), and
regressions 22 and 23 to the total of pi-ivate and public investment (i/y).
The figures on i/y come from Summers and Ileston (1988); note that these
values reflect variations across countries in the ratio of the investment
deflator to the GOP deflator. Values for i"/y equal i/y less estimates of
the ratio of real public investment to real GOP. The data on public
investment are described in Barro (1989a). (Figures on nominal public
investment were divided .y the Summers- Heston deflators for total investment,
and were then divided by real GD?; this procedure is appropriate if the
deflators for total investment are good approximations to the deflators for
public investment.) Values for public investment at the level of
consolidated general government (but excluding most government enterprises)
were found only for the 1970-85 period, and only for 76 countries.
Therefore, 1Pt"1 is an average of values from 1970 to 1985 for this limited
sample.
The simple correlations of i'"/y are .42 with GDP6O and .64 with a
human capital proxy (.131 x SEC6O +.079x PR1M60, based on regression 20 of
Table 3)—see Figures 7 and 8. With GDP6O and the school-enrollment
variables entered together, as in regression 20 of Table 3, the estimated
coefficients of SEC6O and PRIM6O are significantly positive, and that on14
GDP6O is significantly negative. That is, holding fixed the human capital
measures, the partial association between jPlS'/y and GDP6O becomes negative.
Regression 22 shows results for i/y. (This variable is measured over the
period 1960 to 1985, but the main difference from regression 20 is the shift
from private to total investment, and not the change in the averaging
interval for the dependent variable.) The results for total investment are
broadly similar to those for private investment, but the estimated
coefficient on GDP6O is smaller in magnitude.
The results in Tables 1-3 treat per capita growth, fertility, and
investment as endogenous variables that are jointly determined by the
right-hand side variables (although the exogeneity of some of the explanatory
variables can surely be questioned). In theoretical models, such as Becker
and Murphy (1988) and Barro (1989b), per capita growth and the investment
ratio tend to move together, while per capita growth and net fertility tend
to move inversely. That is, even holding constant the explanatory variables
included in the regressions, the theories predict that the residuals from the
equations for CR6085 and i/y (or CR6085 and i'"/y) would be positively
correlated, while those for CR6085 and FERTNET would be negatively
correlated. The results from Tables 1-3 accord with this pattern. For
example, using regression 1 for CR6085, regression 22 for i/y, and regression
15 for FERTNET, the correlation of residuals is .32 between CR6085 and i/y
and -.26between CR6085 and FERTNET. Using regression 20 for the
correlation of the residuals for CR6085 and iP''"/y (for 76 countries) is
.40.
Another way to bring out these patterns is to consider regressions for
per capita growth in which an investment ratio and net fertility are included15
as regressors. Regression 24 of Table 4 shows that the estimated coefficient
of i/y is significantly positive: .068, s.e. =.032.With FERTNET added in
regression 25, the estimated coefficient of i/y is still significantly
positive, and that for FERTNETissignificantly negative:
-.0043,s.e. =
.0014.
Even with i/y and FERTNET held constant, the coefficient of CDP6O in
regression 25 (-0fl77,s.e. =.0009)is about the same as that in regression
1 of Table 1. Therefore, the negative effect of the level of per capita CDI'
on the subsequent growth rate does not work through effects on investment and
net fertility (see regressions 22 and 15). The main channel appears to be a
lower rate of return on investment. On the other hand, the estimated
coefficients on the school-enrollment variables in regression 25 are much
smaller than those in rezression 1. Thus, the positive effects of the
school-enrollment rates on CR6085 in regression 1 reflect partly the positive
relation between school enrollment and i/y (regression 22 in Table 3) and the
negative relation between school enrollment and FERTNET (regression 15 in
Table 2).
Effects of Other Variables
Government ExDenditures
In previous analysis (Barro, 1989a, 1989b), I found that the ratio of
real government consumption expenditure to real GDP (gC/y) had a negative
association with growth and investment. The argument was that government
consumption had no direct effect on private productivity (or private property
rights), but reduced saving and growth through the distorting effects from
taxation or government-expenditure programs. Coverninent consumption is16
measured by the Summers-Heston (1988) figures on the ratio of real government
consumption purchases to real GDP, less estimates of the ratio of nominal
government spending on education and defense to nominal 6DP The idea is
that expenditures on education and defense are more like public investment
than public consumption; in particular, these expenditures are likely to
affect private-sector productivity or property rights, which matter for
private investment. I used nominal ratios for education and :fense because
deflators were unavailable. Since the numbers on education and defense are
averages for 1970-85, the data on gC/y are averages over this period.
The results in Table 1 indicate a significantly negative association
between gc/y and growth; for example, in regression 1 the estimated
coefficient is -.12,s.e. =.03.7Figure 9 shows the nature of this
relationship—the variable on the vertical axis is the per capita growth rate
net of the fitted value obtained from all regressors other than gc/y• Table
3 shows that gc/y also has a negative association with private investment;
the estimated coefficient in regression 20 is -.24,s.e. =.12.However,
regression 22 shows that the relation with total investment is insignificant
(-.02,s.e. =.11).
A negative effect of gC/y on investment is one route whereby more
government could reduce growth. However, even with the investment ratio held
constant, the relation between gC/y and growth is significantly negative.
For example, in regression 24 of Table 4, which holds constant i/y, the
estimated coefficient on gC/y is -.12,s.e. =.03.
7Jf entered separately, the ratios to CUP of overnment expenditures on
education and defense are each insignificant in an equation for per capita
growth. These types of results were discussed in Barro (1989a).17
Regression 26 of Table 4 includes the public investment ratio, g'/y, as
an explanatory variable. The estimated coefficient, .13, s.e. =.10,is
positive, but insignificantly different from zero. I discussed this variable
in my earlier empirical study (Barro, 1989a), and mentioned some difficulties
in interpreting the estimated coefficient in terms of the marginal product of
public services. In any event, regression 27 shows that public investment
plays no special role if the total investment ratio, i/y (for 1970-85), is
also included as a regressor. Given i/y, which includes public investment
one-to-one with private investment, the estimated coefficient on g'/y is
essentially zero. Similarly, regression 28 shows that the estimated
coefficient of the ratio of public to total investment, g'/i, differs
insignificantly from zero.
Political Instability
I included two variables from Banks's (1979) data set to measure
political instability. The variable REV is the number of revolutions and
coups per year, and the variable ASSASS is the number per million population
of political assassinations per year. Each of these variables is
significantly negative for growth in Table 1. The variable REV is also
significantly negative for the investment ratios in Table 3, while ASSASS is
significantly negative in regression 20 of that table.8 I interpret these
variables as adverse influences on property rights, and thereby as negative
8With these political instability variables and the school-enrollment rates
included, Gastil's (1987) ordinal indices of political rights or civil
liberties are insignificant for growth, fertility, or investment. Iy earlier
study (Barro, l989a) included the index of political stability as an
explanatory variable.18
influences on investment and growth. However, regression 25 of Table 4 shows
that the coefficients on REV and ASSASS are still negative for growth when
i/y and FERTNET are held Constant. It is possible that these results reflect
a positive influence of growth on political stability, rather than (or in
addition to) the effects of stability on growth.
Economic System
Gastil (1987) divided countries into economic systems with respect to the
role of government. I used this breakdown to construct a three-way division
into primarily socialist, mixed between socialist and free enterprise, and
primarily free enterprise. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable
for socialist (SOC) is negative on growth in regression 13 of Table 1
(t-value =1.8),while that for mixed systems (MIXED) is essentially zero.
Since the division of economic systems into groups is subjective and since
there are only nine "socialist" countries in the sample (which excludes the
eastern European countries), these results are not very reliable.
Market Distortions
It is often argued that distortions of market prices impact negatively oi
economic growth (see, for example, Agarwala, 1983.). Because of the intimate
connection between investment and growth, such market interferences would be
especially important if they apply to capital goods. As an attempt to
quantify these types of market distortions for a large sample of countries,
considered the purchasing-power-parity numbers for investment goods that wer
computed by Summers and Heston (1988). It is well known (for example, from
Balassa, 1964) that PPP ratios calculated with broad price indices, such as19
GDP deflators or consumer price indices, are systematically related to the
level of economic development and perhaps to the presence of natural
resources and other variables. Figure 10 shows the significantly positive
relation for the 98 countries between the 1960 PPP ratio based on the GDP
deflator (PPPY6O) and GDP6O. This relation presumably reflects the
relatively low prices of services and some other non-traded goods in
low-income countries. On the other hand, Figure 11 indicates the absence of
a regular relationship between the 1960 PPP ratio based on the investment
deflator (PPPI6O) and CDP6O. To proxy for market distortions, I would have
filtered out the normal relation of PPPI6O to variables such as the level of
income. But, given the absence of a systematic relation in Figure 11, I
calculated just the magnitude of the deviation of PPPI6O from the sample
mean. In this view, eitir artificially high investment prices or
artificially low investment prices proxy for distortions.
The regressions in Table 1 indicate a significantly negative relation
between growth and the magnitude of the PPPI6O deviation (denoted PPI600EV)--
the estimated coefficient in regression 1 is -.014,s.e. =.005.This result
implies that a one-standard-error (.25) increase in the magnitude of PPPI6O
is associated with a reduction in the per capita growth rate by 4-tenths of a
percentage point. On the other hand, the sign of the deviation does not seem
to matter; if the algebraic value for purchasing-power parity, PPPI6O, is
added to the equation, its estimated coefficient is insignificant (-.001,
s.e. =.005),while that on PPI6ODEV remains significant (-.014,s.e. =
.007).Not surprisingly, the results in Table 3 indicate that the algebraic
value, PPPI6O, matters negatively for the investment ratios. (However, this20
relationship could be induced from measurement error in the investmentpric
deflators.)
These results on the relation of growth and investmentto market
distortions are preliminary. I plan to look further into alternative
measures of price distortions, including the indices of effectiveprotectioi
in manufacturing and agriculture that Agarwala (1983)compiled for a limite
sample of countries
Africa and Latin America
A common view is that countries in Africa or Latin America havepoorer
growth performances than other countries. Of course, if the nature ofbeing
in Africa or Latin America is already held constantby the other explanator)
variables, continent dummies would be insignificant in equations forgrowth,
fertility, or investment. Thus, the finding of significant coefficientson
these dummies would indicate that some regularitiesare missing from the
model.
The dummy variable AFRICA equals one for countries insub-Saharan Africa
and the dummy variable LAT. AMER. equalsone for countries in South and
Central America, including Mexico. The estimated coefficienton AFRICA is
significantly negative for GR6085 (Table 1, regression 14) andsignificantly
positive for FERTNET (Table 2, regression 19).Although the point estimates
are positive, the estimated coefficients for the investment ratiosdiffer
insignificantly from zero (Table 3, regressions 21 and 23).Holding fixed
i/y and FERTNET in regression 29 of Table 4, the estimatedcoefficient of
AFRICA in a growth equation is stillsignificantly negative, with a magnitud
of about onepercentage point per year. Thus, there appear to be adverse21
effects on growth from being in sub-Saharan Africa, and theseeffects do not
result from the unexplained behavior of the investment ratioor fertility.
The variable LAT.AMER. is significantly negative for CR6085(Table 1,
regression 14) and significantly positive for FERTNET (Table 2,regression
19). For the investment ratios, the point estimates of the coefficientsare
negative, but not statistically significant at the 5 level (t-value of 1.3
for Pr1\'1 in regression 21 of Table 3 and t-value of 1.6 fori/ n
regression 23). Again, the negative effect on growth—with a magnitude of
about one percentage point per year—appears even when i/y and FERTNETare
held constant (Table 4, regression 29). Thus, itappears that something is
also missing to explain the typically weak growth performance in Latin
America.
Note from a comparis of regressions 1 and 14 of Table 1 thatone effect
from the inclusion of the AFRICA and LAT.AMER. dummies isa reduction in the
estimated coefficient of SEC6O in the equation for CR6085 from.0305,
s.e =.0079,to .0133, s.e. =.0070(see also regressions 25 and 29 in Table
4). The average value of SEC6O for sub-Saharan Africa is well below the
sample mean (.04 versus .23), while that for Latin America (.19) is slightly
below the sample mean.9 The variables SEC6O and PRIM6Oare imperfect proxies
for the level of human capital, which is especially low in Africa.But,
since these proxies are imperfect, itmay be that continent
dummies_especially the one for Africa—retain some explanatory power for
human capital and hence for the rate of economic growth. If this
9For PRL\160, the neans are .50 for Africa. .85 for Latin America. and .78 for
the overall sample.22
interpretation is correct, a better proxy for human capital would eliminate
the AFRICA dummy as a significant influence on growth. However, the
variables considered before—student-teacher ratios, prior values of
school-enrollment rates, and the adult literacy rate—do not eliminate AFRI(
as a significant variable.
Concluding observations
Using recent theories of economic growth as a guide, this study brings
out some empirical regularities about growth, fertility, and investment for
98 countries in the period 1960-85. Although the simple correlation between
per capita growth and the initial (1960) level of per capita GDP is close to
zero, the correlation becomes substantially negative once initial human
capital per person (proxied by school enrollment rates) is held constant.
Moreover, given the level of initial per capita GDP, the growth rate is
substantially positively related to the starting amount of human capital.
Thus, poor countries tend to catch up with rich countries if thepoor
countries have high human capital per person (in relation to their level of
per capita GDP), but not otherwise. As a related matter, countries with hig
human capital have low fertility rates and high ratios ofphysical investmen
to GDP.
Per capita growth and the ratio of private investmentto GD? are
negatively related to the ratio of government consumption expenditure to GDP
An interpretation is thatgovernment consumption introduces distortions, suc
as high taic rates, but does not provide an offsetting stimulus to investment
and growth. On the other hand, there is little relation ofgrowth to the
quantity of public investment.23
Measures of political instability (proxied by figures on revolutions,
coups, and political assassinations) are inversely related to growth and
investment. These relations could involve the adverse effects of political
instability on property rights and the linkage between property rights and
private investment. However, the correlation could also reflect a political
response to bad economic outcomes.
A proxy for price distortions (based on pirchasing_power parity numbers
for investment deflators) is negatively related to growth. These results are
preliminary but do suggest a payoff to further research on the interplay
between economic growth and government-induced distortions of markets.
Finally, the results leave unexplained a good deal of the relatively weak
growth performances of countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.
That is, the analysis do's not yet isolate the fundamental characteristics of
the typical country on these continents that lead to below-average economic
growth.24
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.50 .58 .63 .57 .58 .62
.0168 .0125 .0123 .0127 .0126 .0119Notes to Table 1:
See Table 5 for definitions of variables.
Standard errors of coefficient estimates appear in parentheses. Except for
the weighted reressions 6 and 7, the values are based on White's (1980)
heteroskedasticity- consistent covariance matrix.
For regression 6, only the 55 observations with GDP6O above £1000 per capita
were used. For regression 7, the observations are weighted by IGDP6O, and
for regression 8 by 4ii1.Inthese cases the statistics for It2 and o- shown
in parentheses are the weighted values.Table 2: Regressions for Fertility
(15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
dep. var. FERTNET FERT FERTNETGP0P6085FERTNET
const. 6.08 5.38 5.35 .0326 5.92
(0.35) (0.62) (0.56) (.0034) (0.37)
GDP6O -. 105 -.093 -. 100 -.0005 -. 129
(.069) (.068) (.067) (.0007) (.062)
SEC6O -3.01 -2.62 -2.62 -.0229 -2.36
(0.59) (0.67) (0.66) (.0059) (0.58)
PRIM6O -1.56 -1.27 -1.14 -.0072 -1.60
(0.41) (0.51) (0.46) (.0037) (0.43)
gC/y 1.0 0.8 0.7 -.009 0.1
(1.5) (1.6) (1.5) (.013) (1.4)
REV - .13 -.31 -.25 -.0015 -.24
(.32) (.34) (.31) (.0025) (.33)
ASSASS 1.45 1.65 1.61 .0065 0.95
(0.55) (0.57) (0.55) (.0051) (0.60)
PPI600EV .40 .42 .41 .0034 .39
(.26) (.28) (.26) (.0026) (.27)






.76 .83 .77 .58 .78
.72 .77 .72 .0066 .70
Notes: Each regression has 98 observations. See Table 5 for definitions of
variables. See the notes to Table 1 for additional information.Table 3: Regressions for Investment Ratios
(20) (21) (22) (23)
dep. var. Priv1 1Priv/
no. obs. 76 76 98 98
const. .175 .164 .168 .158




(.0048) (.0047) (.0046) (.0044)
SEC6O .13i .121 .140 .139
(.041) (.044) (.045) (.047)
PRIM6O .079 .098 .086 .104
(.027) (.026) (.022) (.021)
gC/y
-.24 -.25 -.02 -.04
(.12) (.13) (.11) (.10)
REV -.055 -.039 -.058
-.049




(.027) (.029) (.042) (.042)
PPI6ODEV .023 .021 .040 .044
(.023) (.022) (.025) (.025)
PPP 160 -.065 -.072 -. 087
-. 098





.58 .60 .62 .65
-
.047 .047 .050 .049
Notes: See Table 5 for definitions of variables. See the notes to Table
for additional information.Table 4: Interactions between Growth and Investment
(24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29)
no. obs. 98 98 76 76 76 98
const. .0229 .0494 .0391 .0315 .0401 .0447
(.0073) (.0119) (.0079) (.0081) (.0094) (.0119)
GDP6O -. 0072 -.0077 -.0075 -.0068 -.0076 -. 0070
(.0009) (.0009) (.0010) (.0010) (.0010) (.0009)
SEC6O .0225 .0100 .0312 .0240 .0330 .0004
(.0090) (.0087) (.0074) (.0086) (.0073) (.0084)
PRIU6O .0181 .0118 .0138 .0074 .0151 .0150
(.0060) (.0057) (.0068) (.0082) (.0077) (.0063)
gC/y -.119 -.114 -.132 -.115 -.131 -.094
(.027) (.026) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.024)
REV -.0159 -.0167 -.0158 -.0128 -.0169 -.0146
(.0062) (.0065) (.0067) (.0066) (.0066) (.0059)
ASSASS -.0315 -.0254 -.0345 -.0298 -.0341 -.0179
(.0182) (.0172) (.0169) (.0152) (.0152) (.0149)
PPI6ODEV -.0119 -.0103 -.0202 -.0174 -.0215 -.0106
(.0058) (.0059) (.0052) (.0055) (.0047) (.0052)










AFRICA -- - .0104
(.0035)
LAT.AMER. -- - .0104
(.0028)
.59 .62 .62 .65 .60 .66
.0123 .0120 .0115 .0111 .0117 .0114
Notes :The dependent variable is the rowth rate of real per capita GDP
from 1960 to 1985. See Table 5 for definitions of variables. See the
notes to Table 1 for additional information.Table 5: Means, Standard Deviations, and Definitions of Variables
98-country sample 76-country sample
Variable Mean 0 Mean 0
GR6085 .022 .019 .024 .018
GR7085 .016 .023 .019 .022
GDP6O ($1000) 1.92 1.81 2.21 1.89
QDP85 ($1000) 3.74 3.59 4.34 3.69
i/y .190 .078 .205 .076




gC/y .107 .053 .106 .053
FERT 4.70 1.80 4.39 1.79
MORTO4 .087 .061 .074 .057
FERTNET 4.20 1.42 3.98 1.43
GP0P6085 .0205 .0098 .0194 .0100
POP (mill.) 24.6 63.8 26.2 70.5
SEC5Oa .10 .14 .13 .15
SEC6O .23 .21 .27 .22
SEC85b .53 .29 .59 .28
PRIM5OC .65 .39 .73 .36
PRIM6O .78 .31 .85 .27
PR]185 .96 .19 .98 .16
STTEAPRI 36.5 9.4 34.9 8.4
STTEASECd 19.6 6.9 19.5 7.2
LIT6O .56 .33 .63 .30
REV .18 .23 .16 .23
ASSASS .031 .086 .036 .096
SOC (dummy) .092 .290 .039 .196
MIXED (dummy) .480 .502 .500 .503
PPPI6O .75 .34 .74 .37
PPI6ODEV .23 .25 .24 .28
PPPY6O .57 .18 .60 .18
AFRICA (dummy) .276 .449 .197 .401
LAT.AMER. (dummy) .235 .426 .250 .436
aSamples of 95 and 74countries,respectively.
bSampies of97 and 75 countries,respectively.
CSamples of 97and76 countries, respectively.
dSaIlples of 88 and69countries, respectively.Table 5, continued
)efiuitions of Variables in Tables 1-5:
CR6085(CR7085):Growth rate of real per capita CUP from 1960 to 1985
(1970 to 1985).
GDP6O (GDP7O, GDP85): 1960 (1970, 1985) value of real per capita GDP
(1980 base year).
GDP6osq: Square of GDP6O.
i/y (ify, 70-85): Average from 1960 to 1985 (1970 to 1985) of the ratio
of real domestic investment (private plus public) to real GD?.
iPrlv/y: Average from 1970 to 1985 of the ratio of real private domestic
investment to real GDP.
g'/y: Average from 1970 to 1985 of the ratio of real public domestic
investment to real GDP.
g'/i: Average from 1970 to 1985 of the ratio of real public domestic
investment to real domestic investment (private plus public).
gC/y: Average from 1970 to 1985 of the ratio of real government
consumption (exclusive of defense and education) to real GD?.
FERT: Total fertility rate (children per woman), average of 1965 and
1985.
MDRTO4: Mortality rate for ages 0 through 4, average of 1965 and 1985.
FERTNET:FERTx (1 -MORTO4).
GP0P6085: Growth rate of population from 1960 to 1985.
POP: Population in millions (geometric average of values from 1960 and
1985).
SEC5O (SEC6O, SEC85): 1950 (1960, 1985) secondary-school enrollment
rate.
PRIM5O (PRIM6O, PRIM85): 1950 (1960,1985)primary-school enrollment
rate.
STTEAPRI (S'fl'EASEC): Student-teacher ratio in primary (secondary)
schoolsin1960.
LIT6O: Adult literacy rate in 1960.
REV: Number of revolutions andcoupsper year (1960-85 or sub-sample).
ASSASS:Number of assassinations per million population per year
(1960-85 or sub-sample).
SOC: Dummy variable for socialist economic system.
MIXED: Dummy variable for mixed free enterprise/socialistic economic
system.
PPPI6O: 1960 PPP value for the investment deflator (U.S. =1.0).
PPI6ODEV:Magnitude of the deviation of PPPI6O from the sample mean.
PPPY6O: 1960 PPP value for the GDP deflator (U.S. =1.0).
AFRICA: Dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa.
LAT.AMER.: Dummy variable for Latin America.Table 6: List of Countries in Samples
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118. Indonesia *(
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